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assistance.A common theme which runs through much of the investment literature Is
that private incentives may lead to sub—optimal levels of investment activity.'
The idea has been extended casually to consideration of human capital invest-
ment as well. It is sometimes contended that decisions, made by parents,
have adverse effects on their offspring, which could be prevented if inter-
generational contracts could be struck. If so, a case can be made for govern-
ment intervention or subsidization programs to alleviate these intergenerational
externalities. Specifically, the sub—optimal investment in offspring human
capital may take such obvious forms as poor clothing, too little health care,
or too few resources devoted to the child's education.2 Less obvious exer—
nalities mayresultwhen parents underinvest in themselves because they fail
to consider spill—over benefits to their children. Parental schooling, for
example, may affect the child's ability (or desire) to learn. Dietary patterns
established by parents for themselves may influence the child's eating habits
and affect his health. More directly, healthy parents are less likely to
transmit diseases to their offspring. This paper will examine the effects
of these intergenerational externalities in greater detail,
Models of human capital formation have not 'been scarce in recent years.
Starting with Ben—Porath (1967), a number of one—generation models have been
forthcoming.3 Although the literature most specific to humancapital has tend-
ed to ignore intergenerational aspects4, there is no dirth of theory which
deals specifically with multi—generational questions in other contexts. Models
of the sort presented by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) and most recently
by Barro (1974) and Becker (1974) have considered intergenerational savings
and consumption behavior and related issues. It seems natural, therefore,
that these questions be extended to comprise human capital as well, especially2
given the amount of public attention devoted to schooling, health, food,
and housing subsidization programs.
Before proceeding formally, it is useful to consider the way by which
the intergenerational externality is actualized. If parental decisions affect
the child's welfare, children should be willing to pay their parents to
follow optimal investment schedules. That is, the child should be willing
to compensate parents to obtain an amount of human capital which exceeds the
parent's ownwealth—maximizinglevel (but has spill—overs to their children),
or to invest directly in the children even though they will not directly
capture the returns to this investment. The problem, it is generally sug-
gested, is that the parent has no certainty that his child will repay him.
This is not quite correct, however, in the present institutional setting.
Since the child is under parental jurisdiction and support during the first
few years of his life, the parent has a good deal of discretion over the
amount of resources the child receives. The parent could simply arrange to
transfer a smaller amount to the child than he otherwise would, reffecting
the cost of super—optimal investment. If the child were able to borrow on
his future Income, he would be perfectly willing to go along with his father's
scheme since he would have higher wealth and a consumption set which is every-
where dominant. This notion has its origins In Coase (1960) and more directly
in Becker (1974). If borrowing is difficult for young children, as must be
the case, it would seem that the separation principle becomes inappropriate
and that neither father nor child would prefer to first maximize the child's
wealth and then his utility, subject to maximum wealth. The separation
principle cannot be dismissed so easily, however. In the context of the family,
the child can "borrow" from his father. Consider for simplicity, a three phase3
world ——childhood,adulthood, and retirement. Let X be the amount of
resources used by the child in period zero which consists of his current
consumption plus the wealth—tximizjng level of investment in human capital.
Let Y be defined as the expected present value ofrepayment from the child
to the parent. X Y is then the father's expected cost of a "loan" to
the child. The father will be willing to bear cost X —Yif the child's
utility enters his utility function in such a way that the equilibrium father!
child transfer is greater than or equal to X —Y.If so, the father will
"perfect" the capital market for the child and no externality will bepresent.
Transfers from father to child may involve borrowing on the father'spart.
Higher borrowing costs to the father therefore make it more likely that X —Y
will exceed the equilibrium transfer.
Externalities are more likely to show up then where borrowing costsare
high, where the probability of repayment is low (making Y low), and where
the level of parentally optimal parent—child transfers are low.Thus, for
agivenX —Y,poor children are more likely to suffer externalities than
wealthy ones because the parent—child transfers are lower as the result of
income effects. One might also expect externalities to be moreimportant in
geographically mobile societies since distance may reduce the probability of
repayment. Finally, externalities are likely to be a greater problem during
periods when liquidity difficulties are most serious.
It might well be argued that the family is itself an institution which
reduces the extent of the externality problem. If socialpressures make it
sufficiently costly to "default" on one's parent (by not repaying him in old
age), no resources would have to be witheld from the child to finance the4
investment. Repayment at the "market rate of interest" becomes more likely.
In what follows, a formal model is presented which makes explicit the
nature of deviations between privately and socially optimal levels of human
capital investment. The first part of the discussion will consider externali-
ties which arise because the amount of parental human capital affects the
child's ability to produce his own human capital. Although this type of
externality seems intuitively less common than externalities which take the
form of direct parental underinvestment in children, it turns out that the
latter can be viewed as a specific application of the former. Thus, discus-
sion follows from general to specific.
In the last two sections, an empirical model of schooling externalities
is formulated and estimated. There, schooling as an efficient means of "up-
ward mobility" and income redistribution is examined. Estimates of the opti-
mal externality correcting schooling subsidy are provided.
A General Model:
The problem for society is to maximize the discounted value of wealth
over all generations (since society can act as a guarantor on intergeneration-
al transfers).5 The present value of the first generation's income stream
can be written as6
(1) P1 =1T[R111(t) —C(Ül(T),Ho(r))JerTdT
where H1(r) is the stock of the parent's human capital in year T and
C() is the human capital cost function. R is the rental rate on a unit
of human capital, and can be thought of as the amount by which the market or5
home productivity flow to the individual is augmented by the additional unit
of human capital. It does not include spillover effects to other's produc-
tivity, but is simply the internal benefit. C depends on the rate at which
the father acquires human capital as well as the stock of the grandparent's
human capital in period r.It is this latter effect through which intergen-
erational externalities operate. One can treat the externality between gen-
erations as one which reduces educational costs to children when parental
education increases. We assume that there is no direct effect of grandparent's
and previous generations' human capital stock on the child's cost function.
The cost function also makes the standard assumption of neutrality with
7 respect to own human capital.Thus, it is reasonable that C1 >0,C2 <0,
C11 >0,C220 and C(OH1) 0. If B is the length of a generation
and one child is born each B years, then the second generation's wealth in
period zero dollars is
(2) P2 =0T[RH2(T+B) —C(2.(r+B),Hl(T+B))Je_t+dT
The problem of maximizing wealth over all generations can then be written
as
(3) Max S = —C(j[T+(i_l)],Hj1[r+(j_1)B])]e[T+JdT
s.t. H[O + (i—l)B] =0
111[T + (i—l)BJ =0
H0(i) is given exogenously
H. 0
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=...C11(àH )ñ— C12(nH_1)cL1+ rCj(H,H.1)
fori1, 2,...,
Note that the structure of the system is quasi—recursive. Each state
variable depends directly only upon the stock of human capital inherited from
the previous generation, on the costs and within generation return to invest-
ment, and on the cost—savings to children which result from parental invest-
ment (the C2 term on the left side of (5)). The C12 term on the right
side of (5) reflects the fact that the grandfather's ability to affect costs
of investment to the father depends upon the rate at which the father invests.
Thus, when the father alters his level of investment, he must consider the
effect of this change on cost—saving which results from his parent's investment7
(and the subsequent change in the grandfather's plan as the result of it).
Additionally, since C2 on the left side of (5) depends upon the child's
rate of investment which in turn depends in part upon cost saving to the
grandchild and so on, all generations are linked. If one makes the special
assumption that C120, the system becomes truly recursive. If C12 =0,
C2 is independent of the child's investment behavior so that the fact that
children take grandchildren into account becomes irrelevant. That is, when
the father's ability to save investment resources utilized by his child is
independent of the child's level of investment, the father can totally
ignore the child's actions. Furthermore, cost saving in the current genera-
tion as the result of the previous generation's investment becomes independent
of the level of current investment, i.e., C12 drops out. More will be
said on this below.
Consider the socially optimal path of human capital accumulation for the
first generation. From (5), write
—l —rB .
(6) H1 er) =
C11dii ,H0) ER —C2(H2,H1)e + C12(H1 ,H0)H0 —rC1,H0)]
Since C11 >0,H1 <0when [•}ispositive. If il were positive, this
would imply H10 and H1 I.e.,H1 >0implies that it is optimal
to disinvest. This makes sense. If R —C2<rC1+ C12H0, the flow cost
to investment in human capital exceeds the flow return to the individual plus
the flow value of reduced cost to his child)0 The individual is better off
onverting his stock of human capital into cash and earning the market rate
on the physical asset. (If disinvestment cannot occur, his optimal strategy
is to invest zero.)8
It is now easily seen that investment in human capital by the first
generation is everywhere greater when the social optimization rather than
the private optimization rule is followed. If the first generation chooses
human capital paths to maximize own wealth and no intergenerational transfer




H0(-r) is given exogenously
The Euler equation for this maximization is
(7) R =C11(H1 ,H0)H1 —C12(L1,H0)H0 + rC1 (H1 ,H0)
so that
(8) 1(r) :1 [R + C12(H1,110)H0 —rC1(H11H0)]
C11 (H1 ,H0)
The difference between (6) and (8) is —C2e .Sincethis term is positive,
1i(T) <H(r)for all T (where the superscripts denote social and private
optimal paths). This implies that 5(t) > Her) V TT and that H(i) > H'(r)
for 0 < TT.11 Thus, investment in human capital at each point in time is
larger for social than for private optimization.Q
Ifinvestment were to be increased at time T=0on the promise that
it would be repaid at a later date, it must be the case that the firstgenera-
tion is still alive during repayment in order to avoid thenecessity of in-
terpersonal utility comparisons. This implies a change in the interest rate
which could cause an over— or understatement of the true difference between
the social and private optimum. I.e., since the amount ofcurrent investment






What has happened is that the economy has discovered an unexploited invest-
ment opportunity with a rate of return higher than r.(This takes the form
of sub—optimal human capital investment.) If everything elsewere the same,
total investment would increase from I to I, and the interestrate





later in life. This increase in r would tend to choke off some of the
increased investment in human capital so that estimated differences between
social and private optima are overstated.
The society as a whole, however, has experienced an increase in real
wealth as the investment schedule shifted from 10 to I. This causes a
shift in S0, the direction of which is determined by relative wealth elas-
ticities of present vs. future consumption. If the wealth effect on savings
is sufficiently positive, the interest rate could actually fall (as with
S2(r)). Here the social—private difference is understated. At the other
extreme, S3(r), the wealth effect induces so large a switch to current con-
sumption that total investment and savings actually falls to 13. It must
be the case, however, that investment in human capital has increased since
this is how the increased wealth was generated. (That is, a higher yield
investment replaces a lower yield one). Again, r rises so the deviation
is overstated.
With a bit of manipulation, estimates of the magnitude of the difference
between private and social optima can be obtained. Start with the following
simplifying assumptions: Let C12 =0and assume that C11 is a constant.








This is a Second—order linear differential equation.Suppose that the cost—
reducing externality effect is some fraction, p, of theInternalized,
within generation return so that —C2e' pR whereC2 is evaluated at
its equilibrium level. The solution to (10) is thengiven by
(11) X(T)Alert + A2 ÷
whereA1 and A2 are constants determined by two Initial conditions.
Since H(0)HS(O) =0,X(0) =0,and since IIS(T) =}I(T)=0,k(T) =0.












This term is meaningless without perspective. It istherefore useful to
evaluate H(T) and to calculate X(r)/H(T).Substituting the assumptions
into (8), one obtains
(13)(T)s—ER-rCH(T)}
ii 1]12
Thus (13) is written as
(14) i'(T)— ril(T)=
cli
whichis, again, a second—order differential equation. The solution to (14)
is given by
(15) H(t) =B1e+B2+r11
B1 and B2 are obtained from the initial conditions thatH(O) =0and













This says that if pR of the return to investment in human capital is passed
on to the child and is not captured by the investor, the privately optimal13
stock of human capital will deviate from the socially optimal stock by
exactly that proportion, p. Furthermore, this is true at all points in
time as well as for the highest attained levels of human capital H(T)
and HS(T). If it can be argued that p is not trivial, (say, 10%), there
will be a substantial potential difference between social and private optima.
Nor is the nature of the externality restricted to intergenerational forms.
Nothing in equations (9) through (17) required any parent—child linkage.
If —C2e and the corresponding pR are thought of as the within—genera-
tion spillover effect of human capital (the benefits that peers receive from
having higher H(r) friends), the argument still applies. Any estimate of
p still provides an estimate of the deviation between private and social
optima, irrespective of whether its causes are inter— or intragenerational.
An estimate of the size of transfer necessary to induce an individual
to move to the socially optimal level of investment can also be easily ob-
tained. If the individual received R + pR rental on his human capital
rather than simply R, he would move to the social rather than private op—
timum. Thus, the required subsidy in period iis
(18) F =pR(H8(r))=pR(l+ p)(H(T))
so that the present value of the lifetime transfer is
(19) F =1TpR(l + p)HP(T)e_rTdT
Substituting from (16),14
(20) F =pR2(l-fp)1T [Te_rte_2t_T)+e_ T+T)
]dT
Thus,
(21) F =pR2(1+p)[re_rT(e_rT —1-T-l/r)+ 1]
r C11
IfT =60,r =.1and p =.1,
(22) F =(108.06)—
Cli
R and C11are both determined exogenously (the former being market determin—
ed,the latter being technologically determined), but are in theory, estimable)2
It is clear that as C11 falls toward zero, the required transfer rises.
This makes sense. As the marginal cost of investment rises less steeply,
the difference between HS(T) and H'(r) increases (although its proportion
to H(T) does not) so that the required subsidy becomes larger.
So far, two extreme cases have been discussed. In the first case, the
parent is assumed to take all generations into account (he maximizes S) and
in the second case, he takes only himself into account when compiling his
life—time investment strategy. An intermediate case is now considered.
Suppose that the parent ignors all future generations beyond his direct
offspring. He takes only his child into account. Assume further that all
generations are similar so that the child only considers his child and so
forth. The question is whether or not the optimal path in this situation15
differs from paths obtained when S is maximized. Under the assumption
that C12 =0,it is clear that the two—generation problem is the same as
maximizing S. Here, all the Euler equations in (5) are two—generational.
The individual's investment depends only upon an exogenously given stock of
parental human capital and his own level of investment. Nothing is affected
by his child's investment level, so whether ornot the child takes grandchil—
ren into account becomes irrelevant.
Even when C12 #0,it turns out that the two—period maximization is
the same as the multi—period problem as long as each child also performs the
two—period maximization problem. The reasoning is straightforward. The two—
period problem is
(23) Max (P1+P2) =0T11[RH1 —C(Hj,Hj_1)le_r(t_JBldT
s.t.H1(t) =0V I s.t.t(i—1)B
111(t) =0V i s.t. t<(i—1)B
H1(T+(i—l)B) =0
where H2(t) is determined by
Max (P2+P3) =1T —C(i,Hil)]e_T+_2dT
s.t. H.(t) =0vs.t.t(i—l)B
H.(t) =0V s.t. t>(i—1)B
H.(T+(i—l)B) =016
where I13(t) is determined by




The solution to each of the subsidiary constraints generates a system




Thedistinction between this system and the one in (4) is that in each
problem all non—present period state variables are treated as exogenous.
However, since the system must still be solved simultaneously, all equations
are linked as they are in (4). In other words, the fact that the parent
cares about his child forces him also to care about his child's actions.
Since the child consideres the grandchild, the parent is linked to future
generations exactly as if he took them explicitly into account. This would
not be the case if the parent's stock of human capital affected the grandchild's
cost function, but the parent took only the child into account. Then, a term
equal to _C2(Hi+2,Hj)e2, present in the Euler equations for maximization
of S, would be absent in each Euler equation corresponding to maximization
of +17
The preceding few paragraphs make one point: If individuals maximize
wealth over as many generations as are directly affected by their own in-
vestment, private decisions will be socially optimal. One should not infer
from this, however, that the intergenerational externality has been rendered
ineffective. It is clear that two—generational transfers do occur. However,
for reasons already discussed, there may still be impediments to free trans-
fer of funds from the child to the parent. The fact that ote observes trans-
fers from child to parent and from parent to child is in no way sufficient
to establish that the means exist for intergenerational payment for parental
schooling.13
Direct Underinvestment:
Let us now consider intergenerational externalities which manifest
themselves as direct underinvestment in the child. This second type of
externality, it will be seen, is easily treated within the above framework.
The question of direct underinvestment is not an entirely new one. In an
interesting paper, Ishikawa (1975) discusses the problem, as specific to
education, in a family context. He suggests that if parents are selfish,
they underinvest in the child because they only consider his earnings
until the time of the child's "independence." The child may make adjustments
after independence, but this Is necessarily worse than optimal investment
undertaken throughout the entire lifetime. This story is somewhat unrealis-
tic, however, and results in a perhaps misleading conclusion (underinvstinent
in education). It seems better to think of transfers from the child to
parent as being a function of the child's net income, which can be affected
by investment in human capital or by direct monetary transfers from the parent.
The previous model can be modified to consider this question.18
Let H(r) be individual j's privately optimal plan for individual
l's human capital stock (j =iin the case of the individual's own private
optimum). Let M(T), the expected present value of transfer from child to
parent, be a function of the child's discountedincome,14
(25) M(T + B)f(RH2(r + B)ert)
This M(T + B) should be thought of as the present value of "repayment"
that results from income earned in period (r + B). (If the child were
able to immediately "repay" his parent, he might just as well finance his
own investment directly.) It is assumed here that the parent bears thefull
cost of the child's investment. This assumption is more than necessary,
but not completely superfluous. If the child commanded his own resources,
he would obtain human capital up to the wealth maximizing level, irrespective
of parental actions. Parental subsidies would be regarded as lump sum trans-
fers and would in no way change optimal human capital paths because it
would not alter the child's marginal cost of investment. Nor would exceeding
the wealth—maximizing level of human capital ever be worthwhile from the
parent's point of view. A lump sum cash transfer would be preferable to both
parties. Thus, it must be assumed that the child faces a liquidity constraint,
which prevents him from unilaterally achieving wealth maximization. For sim-
plicity, and without loss of generality, this is assumed to occur at zero
dollars, the child is unable to finance any of his own investment. Further,
for simplicity, assume C2 =0.The "selfish" parent will then maximize19
(26) max P = [I1(+ B) —C(li1(T+ B))erT]dT
or
max pi =T[f(Pl(÷B)er)—CdL1&+ B)e]dT
s.t.H1(B)=0
(T + B) =0
j21 0
The Euler equation is then
(27) Rf' =rC1(ñ(r+ B)) -C11(i1'(t+ B))fi'
or
(28) = [Rf'—rC1I
The social maximization is given by
(29) max pS =1T[RH(t + B) -C(ñ(T+ B))IertdT
s.t. H(B) =0




The relationship between and H1 depends upon whether f' is greater
or less than one. If f' <1,ñ1 > sothat 1i1(t + B) < +B)
and H1(T + B) < +B) for all (t)> o.15The reverse does not hold.
If f' >1,H1(T + B) =H(T+ B), but the former never will exceed the
latter. The reason is that both child and parent would prefer direct cash
transfers from the latter to the former rather than investment in the child's
human capital beyond the wealth—maximizing level)6 f' should be interpret-
ed as the child's marginal propensity to transfer resources to his parent.
Since the income elasticity of child—to—parent transfers equals
T
where ST (< 1) is the share of the child's wealth spent on parental trans-
fers, f' will exceed 1 only if child—to—parent transfers are sufficiently
luxurious. Yet nothing rules this out a priori so that even the "selfish"
parent may invest optimally for his child.
To the extent that sub—optimal investment occurs, one might expect
situations to arise which reduce the magnitude of the problem. Again, the
family might be exactly that sort of institution. If generation 2 invests
optimally for generation 3 because generation 1 did so for generation 2,
reliance on transfers from child to parent become less necessary. Social
stigmas associated with failure to invest optimally in one's child can be
thought of as an enforcement mechanism in this scheme to insure efficient
intergenerational resource allocation.21
An Empirical Methodology:
In this section, a technique is sketched by which the size of the
father—child externality can be estimated. Let us confine our discussion
to the externality which results in underinvestment by the parent in his
own education because he ignores spillovers to his child. It is this
manifestation of the externality that relates to questions of intergenera-
tional upward mobility. It is no secret that there is a positive correla-
tion between an individual's income and his parents' educational attainments.
If an externality exists in that parents do not invest enough in their own
education,their children may be "doomed" to a life of poverty. Lip ser-
vice at least, is paid to this factor as a justification of subsidized
schooling, especially to disadvantaged groups. It is therefore important
to consider the size of the "upward mobility" externality.
The formulation above states that the perceived rental rate is R
while the actual social rate is R + pR. Define one year of education as
H =1and assume that P, the present value of the flow of the private
rental rate over the lifetime is the same for all units of education. The
prices, P, can vary across individuals depending upon their productivity
at school. If individuals invest in education at H =1per year then
write the cost of education function for individual I as
(31) Cost E K1(E, Xñ =1)
where E is number of years of schooling and X is a vector of personal
characteristics, one of which is the parent's level of education. On the
margin the perceived marginal return to a unit of education, P, must22
equal the marginal cost so that
(32) P =K(E,XIñ =1)
If the cost function is monotonic in E, equation (32) can be inverted with
respect to E, so in equilibrium,
(33) E =K11(P,xñ =1)
The difference between socially and privately optimal levels of E is then
approximately
(34) cE =Ki(P,xIñ =
dP
where dP =p*P,i.e., the difference between social and private returns.
Note that p*P is not the total amount of intergenerational spillover, but
merely the amount that the parent chooses to ignore. So
(35) ES —EaKl'(P,XIH =1)
(p*P)
Estimation:
To obtain estimates of Q* and thereby infer ES —E,it is necessary
first to determine the cost function, K(E, Xñ =1),(henceforth written as
K(E,X)). Data from the Michigan Income Dynamics Study (1966—1974) will be23
used for this purpose. This study contains information on the education,
family background expenditure patterns and earnings of .ihout 5500 individuals.
For this analysis, a subsample of 1455 individuals was selected to meet the
following criteria: First, all were male heads of households above 30 years
of age (to insure that their highest level of schooling attained reflected
lifetime schooling). Second, information on relevant background variables
and current wage rates was available.
Given these data, It is necessary to choose a functional form for ihe
cost function. Following the method developed in Lazear (1976a), a Cobb-
Douglas function should be sufficiently general for the purpose. Thus, let
(36) K(E,X) =nEYNóAOMLexp(AS+t + vY + Z + aD + irV)
whereE is the highest grade of schooling completed by the individual
F is the highest grade of schooling completed by the father
N is the highest grade of schooling completed by themother
N is the number of siblings
A is the individual's age (a vintage effect)
S is a dummy set equal to one if the individual was raised in the South
D is a dummy set equal to one for whites
L Is a dummy set equal to one if the individualwasraised on .ifarm
Y isadummy for being Jewish
V is a dummy for being Catholic
Z Isadummy for having a foreign born mother.24
Taking the log of both sides of (36) produces
(37) in K(E,X) =in+ y in E + in F + 6 in N + 0 in A + c in M + AS
+ aD + + vY + Z + itV
so that given data on K(E,X) for each individual, OLS identifies r,, ,
6,8, c, A, a, i,F,and 7r.Withthese estimates, and attained E, P may
be calculated for each individual. Since in equilibrium P =K1(E,X) where
E is the attained and therefore privately optimal level of schooling an
estimate of P is obtained as
(38) P yE1N6AOMCexp(S +UL+vY + FZ + aD + rrV)
P is determined by inserting the actual values of the attained level of




(40) = [yP_1N6AOMCeXp(.. )]i_
—
[_YN6AONCexp(.)]P2
or equation (35) now becomes
(41) E5 — = [YP1N6AOMCeXp(..
—i
[—yN A M exp(.. )]1 p*25
Inorder to estimate ES —E,all that is needed is information on
left—hand—variable of equation (36) (the cost of a given level of schooling
for an individual with attributes X), and an estimate of p*. Estimates of
the first can be obtained by employing a transformation of foregone earnings.
The method is described in detail in Lazear (1976a) and will only be sketched
here. The method is to estimate what the wage rate would have been during
the jth year of school based upon endowment characteristics and accumulated
schooling to that point. The wage rate multiplied by the hours of school
then provides an estimate of the foregone earnings component of schooling.
Direct costs are assumed to be zero through grade 12 and then one—half of
foregone earnings thereafter. The result is that
J 1 j+5
(830 + 7Oi)W(T) for J12
(39) K(J,X)
12 j+5 i j+5
j1 (830 + 7Oj)W'('j-)+ 1.5 jl3 (830 +7OJ)W(j)
forj >12
(830+ 70j) is the hours of school functionl W is the predicted wage in
year j and is obtained by estimating the following wage function:
(40) W72 =a0+ a1E + a2N + a3A + aA2 + a5F + a5M + a7S + a8L
+ a9Y + a10V + a11Z + a12D + a13DM + a1D•F
where is the individual's wage rate in 1972. The results of that
estimation by OLS and contained in table 1. W* is then defined as26
(41) =a0 +a1(j)+ a2N + a3(j+5) + a(j+5)2 + a5F + a5M + a7S
+a8L + a9Y +a10V + a11Z + a12D + a13D•M + aD•F
Now all variables are specified so that the parameters of equation (37) may
be estimated. The results are contained in Table
From estimation of (36), all the relevant parameters have been obtained
to solve for ES —Eexcept for p*. It should be recalled that p*P is
the unaccounted for proportion of the return to education that is captured
by the individual's child, rather than by the individual himself. Thus,
p*P Is not the total spillover to the following generation. However, since
p where pP is the total intergenerational spillover, an upper bound
to the difference between ES —Eis given by (pP).Estimates
of pP can be obtained. Estimation of equation (40) reveals a significant
effect of parental education on an individual's wage rate. If the relation-
ship is in fact a causal one (rather than merely reflecting unobserved ability
differences), and if the effect of parental education on work is the same as
its effect on non—worked time (neutrality in the sense of Michael [1972]),
then the value of a year of a male's education to his (male) child is
(42) (pP) =30
W72 (876O)e_rTdr
andof a female to her (male) child is
(43) (pP)' =3of903W72 (876O)eTdT27
Table 1
Regression Results













S (South dummy) —.3612 —.3513
(.2183) (.0320)
L (Farm dummy) —.4477 —.4028
(.2003) (.0300)
Y (Jewish dummy) 1.320 .7518
(.524) (.0685)
V (Catholic dummy) .4950 .3880
(.2419) (.0329)
Z (Foreign mother dummy) .6771 .5258
(.2981) (.0402)



















Number of observations equals 1455. Figures in parentheses are standarderrors.28
where 8760 is the number of hours in a year. Using the estimates, pP and
(pP)' are $168 and $219 respectively for white individuals. Thus, at most,
the difference between ES and E evaluated at the point of means is
(44) ES — KIP,X) (pP) =(.00168)(168)=.282years for white fathers
and
(45) ES —E (.00168)(219) =.369for white mothers.
If the parent takes none of the spill—over into account, he will underinvest
in his owneducationby at most one—third year. A few comments are in order.
First, this calculation has taken as given current levels of educational
subsidy. The estimation of the socially optimal level of education assumes
that current subsidies occur for reasons which do not include, but are addi-
tive to intergenerational spillovers. Even under this assumption which' yields
the largest possible estimate of additional efficient schooling, the efficient
amount is less than one—third of a year.
Second, the calculation is for the "average" white individual, It might
be interesting to consider groups of individuals who normally acquire fewer
years of schooling than the population as a whole. Non—whites and individuals
from low income households immediately come to mind. Since schooling subsidies
are often directed at these groups (especially with respect to higher educa-
tion), it is useful to consider them separately.
By segmenting the sample, the calculation performed in (44) can be re-
peated for blacks and low income individuals. For blacks, equation (14)
yields estimates of pP and (pP)' of $693 and $184 respectively. (Note
that color interacts with the F and M effects.) Using these estimates29
and the conditional mean values of the endowment variables for black indivi-
duals, one obtains
(46) ES —E (.0033)(693) =2.297years for black fathers and
and
(47) ES —E (.0033)(184) =.610years for black mothers.
A question was included on the survey that asked whether or not the
individual was from a poor home. The variable of questionable interest for
two reasons. First, about 45% of the sample replied that they did in fact
come from poor families. Second, the variable did not interact significantly
with either F or M in the wage equation. Nevertheless, it is informative
to segment the sample to see whether E5 —Efor poor whites is similar to
ES — for.blacks. Again, for whites (pP) and (pP)' are $168 and $219
respectively. So for poor white males,
(48) —E (.00244)(l68) =.409years
and for poor white females,
(49) ES —E (.00244)(219) =.534years
For Ierichtt white males,
(50) ES —E' (.00l556)(168) =.261years30
and for rich white females,
(51) ES —E1'(.001556)(219) .341 years
Thus, maximum estimates of the deviation between social and private
optimal levels of schooling for "poor" whites resemble those forrich
whites much more than those for blacks. The primary reason is that costs
of schooling differ so substantially between blacks and whites as the result
of differential foregone earnings.
One additional caveat is in order. An implicit assumption in the
above analysis is that parental education is a private rather than a public
good. That is, education used to further the productivity of one child can-
not then be used again to affect a second one. This makes sense if one thinks
of the benefits from education as being realizable only when combined with
parental time. If, on the other hand, education is a pure public good, the
spillover to the next generation would approximately equal
Nf90 aw72(8760)
30 3F e
where N Is the number of children (this calculation ignores the fact that
children are usually born at different times). The truth probably lies
somewhere in the middle; education is neither a purely public nor purely
private good.
18
Let us recap. This section started by asking, what is the value of and
desired level of subsidization associated with the "upward mobility" external—
ity produced by education. Specifically, how much of a case can be madefor31
subsidized schooling on the grounds that it is an efficient way to improve
the long—run standard of living of low income individuals. A lump—sum trans-
fer of income to the poor has the advantage that the recipient's own utility
is maximized in this manner. However, it has the disadvantage that it does
not correct intergenerational inefficiencies generated by education spillover
effects. An alternative is to tax the present generation and invest these
resources. On the margin this returns rate r which could then be trans-
ferred to the future generation if desired. This is the justification for
discounting spillovers to children at rate r: it is the opportunity cost
of those funds to them as well as to individuals currently alive.
To this point, the findings are that no additional subsidy of any size
to white individuals is warranted. However, the upper bound of ES —E
f or black males is substantial. It suggested that these blacks underinvest
in own education by as much as 2.3 years because they fail to consider spill—
over effects. Thus, if the average black male's marginal years of schooling
were subsidized by $693 per year in present value terms or $4192 in age 18
dollars, the required subsidy of (2.3)($4l92) =$9641would induce a move
to the socially optimal level of schooling. This number is based upon the
assumption that none of the spillover is accounted for by the parent and
that education is a purely private good.
Summary and Conclusion:
This paper considers intergenerational externalities produced either
when parental human capital affects an individual's human capital cost
function or when parental decisions about direct investment in a child fail32
to account for the total benefits of that investment. The model is presented
in terms jf general human capital stocks, but the analysis can be made specific
to apply to schooling, health care, "productive" recreation, on—the—job train-
ing, and so forth. The following points are made:
1) In the absence of impediments to borrowing by young children, no
intergenerational externality could be effective. Parents could withold
resources from their young children as payment for privately super—optimal
investment undertaken by the parent on the child's behalf. Both parent and
child would be better off as the latter could borrow freely on his higher
future income to finance smooth lifetime consumption.
2) If intergeneration transfers cannot occur and parental utility
calculations totally ignore the offspring's wealth, the fact that parental
human capital affects an individual's human capital cost function will result
in a deviation between private and socially optimal levels of investment.
If R is the internalized (rental) return to a human capital and pR is
the inter— or intragenerational spillover, the privately optimal stock of
human capital will, at each point in time, be 1/(1 +p)of the socially
optimal stock. Furthermore, the subsidy necessary to correct the underinvest—
ment varies directly with R and p and inversely with C11(the steepness
of the marginal cost of H).
3) It is only necessary that the present generation maximize wealth
over as many generations as are directly affected by its investment. The
recursive nature of decisions guarantees that the social optimum will be
reached if this rule is followed. Thus, in the context of a family, if a
father cares sufficiently about his own offspring, he will invest optimally33
with respect to all future generations even though they enter his utility
functions nor transfer any resources to him.
4) If the parent receives transfers from his child in accordance with
the child's wealth, the socially optimal level of the child's human capital
will exceed the parent's privately optimal level if the child's propensity
to transfer is less than one. The private optimum equals and does not exceed
the social optimum when this propensity Is greater than one. All of the
relevant parameters are empirically obtainable.
5) Estimates of the difference between social and private optimal
levels of schooling reveal that for the mean individual, an upper bound of
.282 years of underinvestnient occurs. If some intergenerational spillovers
are taken into account by the investor, the magnitude will be smaller. The
distribution of underinvestment is important. One finds that low income
individuals and especially black males are more likely to underinvest in
their education from a social point of view than are whites and Individuals
from wealthier homes. An educational subsidy of about $9600 would be required
to induce the average black male to move to the socially optimal level of
schooling if he currently takes none of the intergenerational spillover
into account. To the extent that education has public good attributes, the
optimal subsidy is understated by these estimates. There does seem to be a
case for educational subsidies to the poor in order to efficiently achieve
"upward mobility."FOOTNOTES
1Stigler (1968), Scherer (1970) and Hirschleifer (1971), for example,
consider optimal levels of technological innovations.
number of studies have examined the effect of parental income on the
ability to obtain education. Jencks (1972), et. al., Bowles (1972) and a
preliminary paper by Parsons (1974) are just a few.
3See, for example, Rosen (1972), Rosen (1973), Haley (1973), and Heckman
(1974).
4lshikawa (1974) is an exception and will be discussed below.
5wealth—maximization is a weak criterion. In the context of this paper,
only intertemporal efficiency is considered. It is the fact that generations
overlap that allows us to concern ourselves with wealth rather than utility
maximization. Since fathers are retired when sons are working, repayment
can occur during this stage and both generations will agree that their posi-
tion has been improved. This requires that consumption be delayed, and a
change in the equilibrium interest rate will therefore result. More is said
on this below.
6The notation is similar to that in Rosen (1973). The model assumes
f or simplicity that there is only one parent and one child. Also, at this
point, the assumption that there are no intragenerational externalities is
maintained. This will be relaxed below.
7Lazear (1975) finds support for the assumption that own human capital
is neutral while parental human capital affects human capital returns to a
greater extent than costs. In the context of this model, this implies C2<0.See Brown (1976), Heckman (1974) and Lazear (1976) for more detailed dis-
cussion of the neutrality question.
8 31d 31 The Euler equation states that = ) whereI is the expres—
I I
sion inside the Integral. For H1 =H1,
RerT —C2(2,Hi)e_T+
and








and so forth for each H..
91f H >0,then ñ(i + c) >H(T)for e >0.But H(T) =0so
H(T —c)<0.This implies that 11(T) is negatively sloped everywhere, but
at T. Since H(0) =0,H(T) <0for T> 0.'°Note the distinction between flowreturns and costs to a unit of human
capital and to a unit of investment. On the margin, the cost of additional
H must equal the marginal returns. This is the logic of the Euler equation.
However, the total within period returns to the increased stock of human
capital may clearly exceed total costs as the result of inframarginal rents
on H.
is sufficient to show that given f(x), g(x), the conditions f(O) =
g(O),f'(T) =f'(T),and f"(x) <g"(x)together imply that f'(x) >g'(x)
for 0 x <Tand f(x) >g(x)for 0 <x T. This is easily seen:
Since f"(x) <g"(x)for all x,




f'(T) =g'(T),f'(T—) >g'(T—e)so that f'(x) >g'(x)
for x <T
Similarly,since f'(x) >g'(x)for x <T
•Cf'(x)dx>fE: g'(x)dxSince f(O) =g(O),f(t) >g(c)for t> 0.
12See Lazear (1975), for estimates of R and the parameters of the
parameters of a non—quadratic cost function.
13Potential exists for ascertaining whether or not the parent takes
children into account in his investment plan. If, other things constant,
parents with children obtain higher levels of education than those without
(say, unmarried adults), it can be argued that some parental investment
occurs on the child's behalf.
141n work currently in progress, I am investigating the relationship
between child—to—parent transfers and demographic variables as parental
wealth, child's wealth, number of siblings, level of child's schooling,
marital status, race, etc.
15The proof is identical to that in footnote 9 and need not be repeated
here.
fact, as long as f' >1,the parent will keep transferring dollars
to his child because the present value of the return to the parent exceeds
the cost. In order for transfers to stop short of exhausting total
parental resources, f' must eventually sink below 1.
171n fact, the concept of deviations from socially optimal investment
levels can be usefully extended to other family problems as well. In cur-
rent work, I define "child—neglect" as existing when less than the socially
optimal amount of parent—to—child transfers (for health, housing, education...)
occurs. Thus, a wealthy child may in a real sense be "neglected" to a great-
er extent than one in much poorer condition on an absolute scale.18Even if parental educationwere purely public, ES — wouldbe less
than N times previous estimates. The reason is that the convex.nature
of the cost function means that dPoverstates dE by more as
dP increases.REFERENCES
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